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Abstract – The main results of this paper are theorems which provide a solution to the open problem
posed by Tassa [1]. He considers a specific family Γv of hierarchical threshold access structures and
shows that two extreme members Γ∧ and Γ∨ of Γv are realized by secret sharing schemes which are
ideal and perfect. The question posed by Tassa is whether the other members of Γv can be realized by
ideal and perfect schemes as well. We show that the answer in general is negative. A precise definition
of secret sharing scheme introduced by Brickell and Davenport in [2] combined with a connection
between schemes and matroids are crucial tools used in this paper. Brickell and Davenport describe
secret sharing scheme as a matrix M with n+1 columns, where n denotes the number of participants,
and define ideality and perfectness as properties of the matrix M. The auxiliary theorems presented
in this paper are interesting not only because of providing the solution of the problem. For example,
they provide an upper bound on the number of rows of M if the scheme is perfect and ideal.
1 Introduction
An idea of secret sharing was introduced independently by Blackley [3] and Shamir
[4] in 1979. The basic idea is to distribute pieces of information (shares) about the
secret among a finite set of participants, so that only some sets of them can recover
the secret by pooling together their shares. Such a set of participants is said to be
authorized. The family Γ of all authorized sets of participants is referred to as the
access structure of the scheme.
Before we present a formal definition, we introduce some notions that will be used
throughout this paper. Let P be a finite set of participants and for p ∈ P let S(p)
denote the set of all possible shares which can be given to the participant p. It is
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sometimes convenient to consider a special participant p0 (called a dealer) who shares
a secret. We will use P o to denote P ∪ {p0}. Obviously S = S(p0) is the set of all
possible secrets.
It is a trivial observation that an access structure Γ of a secret sharing scheme has
the monotonicity property, i.e.
A ⊆ B,A ∈ Γ =⇒ B ∈ Γ. (1)
We define Γmin as the family of all minimal sets of Γ.
A secret sharing scheme is said to be connected if every participant is a member of
a certain minimal authorized set. It is easy to see that if a secret sharing scheme is
not connected, then the shares of a certain participant are useless. All secret sharing
schemes considered in this paper are connected.
In practical implementation, secret sharing schemes are expected to be secure and
easy in use. These requirements are satisfied if no information on secrets leaks to
unauthorized sets and shares are as small as possible. Let us introduce the following
definitions.
We say that secret sharing scheme is perfect if each unauthorized set of participants
cannot reveal any information about the secret. It is not hard to show that for every
perfect secret sharing scheme |S(p)| ≥ |S| for all p ∈ P . A secret sharing scheme is
said to be ideal if |S(p)| = |S| for all p ∈ P . Without loss of generality we can assume
that in ideal secret sharing schemes we have S = S(p) for every p ∈ P .
Obviously, when we have a fixed secret sharing scheme, we are able to describe its
access structure. However, investigations concerning secret sharing scheme problems
refer also to the situations where a family Γ ⊆ 2P with monotonicity property is defined
and the goal is to find a secret sharing scheme such that Γ is its access structure. In
such a situation we say that Γ is realized by a secret sharing scheme. It is not easy to
find a suitable scheme that realizes given monotone family of sets of participants if we
require ideality and perfectness. A partial solution to this problem can be found in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 ([5]). For any monotone family Γ ⊆ 2P there exists a perfect secret
sharing scheme with Γ as its access structure.
Unfortunately, a perfect secret sharing scheme constructed by the authors of Theo-
rem 1 for any Γ ⊆ 2P is not ideal, each share is a vector with many entries. It is known
that there exist monotone families of sets of participants which are not realized by a
secret sharing scheme both ideal and perfect (see [6], p.33, Theorem 3).
The idea of hierarchical secret sharing, in which P is composed of levels:
P = P1∪˙ · · · ∪˙Pl. (2)
was introduced by Shamir in [4]. He considered a scheme for a weighted threshold
access structure. That is, every participant has a weight (a positive integer) and a set
is qualified if and only if its weight sum is at least a given threshold. Simmons in [7]
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studied the comparmented access structure:
Γ = {A ⊆ P : ∀i∈{1,2,...,l}|A ∩ Pi| ≥ ki, |A| ≥ k0} (3)
where {ki}
l
i=0 is a sequence of integers such that k0 ≥
∑l
i=1 ki, and the multilevel
access structure:
Γ∨ = {A ⊆ P : ∃i∈{1,2,...,l}|A ∩ (∪
i
j=1Pj)| ≥ ki} (4)
where {ki}
l
i=1 is a monotonically increasing sequence of integers. An access structure
Γ∨ was also considered by Tassa in [1], who called it a disjunctive access structure and
in the same paper he studied a conjunctive access structure:
Γ∧ = {A ⊆ P : ∀i∈{1,2,...,l}|A ∩ (∪
i
j=1Pj)| ≥ ki}. (5)
Moreover, Tassa notices that the above access structures are two extreme members of
a family {Γv : v = 1, . . . , l} of the hierarchical threshold access structures:
Γv = {A ⊆ P : |A ∩ (∪
i
j=1Pj)| ≥ ki for at least v values of i ∈ {1, . . . , l}}. (6)
The question posed by Tassa is whether the other members of Γv can be realized by
ideal and perfect schemes as well. We show that the answer in general is negative.
It is worth pointing out that Farràs and Padró (see [8]) managed to characterize the
ideal hierarchical access structures, that is, those admitting an ideal secret sharing
scheme. Among other things, their work also contains an answer to the question of
Tassa, however, our solution is different and simpler.
2 Secret sharing scheme as a matrix
Brickell and Davenport introduced in [2] the following general and precise definition
of a secret sharing scheme.
Definition 1. Secret sharing scheme with n participants is a matrix M with n+1
columns and entries from a finite set, such that no two rows of M are identical.
The first column of the matrix is assigned to p0, this is the column of secrets. The
other columns are assigned to participants, they are columns of shares. The matrix
M is publicly known and each participant knows which column belongs to him or her.
Before we describe procedures of sharing a secret and pooling shares, we introduce a
few useful notations. Let:
• M(r, p) be the entry in row r and column p.
• M(r, A) be the row r restricted to the columns indexed by A, A ⊆ P o.
• S(p) be the set of elements occurring in column p (it does not contradict the
previous definition).
• S(A) = {M(r, A) : r is a row of M}, A ⊆ P o.
If the dealer wants to share out a secret s ∈ S(p0) among the participants in P ,
he/she:
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(1) picks randomly a row rˆ in which M(rˆ, p0) = s using the uniform distribution
over all such rows;
(2) gives the share αp := M(rˆ, p) to the participant p for every p ∈ P using safe
channel.
If participants in A ⊆ P want to recover the secret s ∈ S(p0):
(1) they pool their shares together;
(2) they take one of the rows r such that αp := M(r, p) for all p ∈ A;
(3) they assume that s = M(r, p0) is the secret.
There is a question whether the value obtained by the participants is always the
secret chosen by the dealer, i.e., when A is an authorized set of participants. In the
matrix settings we are able to give precise definitions of notions mentioned in Section 1.
To do that, we need some additional notions.
We say that the participants in A ⊆ P have no information about the share given to
a participant p ∈ P o \A if
∧
r
∧
β∈S(p)
∨
rˆ
(
M(r, A) = M(rˆ, A) and M(rˆ, p) = β
)
(7)
or equivalently
∧
v∈S(A)
∧
β∈S(p)
∨
r
(
M(r, A) = v and M(r, p) = β
)
. (8)
Otherwise, we say that A has some information about the share given to p. In these
situations we write A  p and A → p respectively. In the other words, A → p if for
at least one vector v ∈ S(A) some values in S(p) cannot be taken as M(r, p) when
M(r, A) = v.
We say that participants in A ⊆ P know the share given to a participant p ∈ P o \A,
denoted by A⇒ p, if
∧
r
∧
rˆ
(
M(r, A) = M(rˆ, A) =⇒ M(r, p) = M(rˆ, p)
)
. (9)
Using the above notation a subset A ⊆ P is authorized if A ⇒ p0 and the access
structure can be described as Γ = {A ⊆ P : A ⇒ p0}. A secret sharing scheme is said
to be perfect if ∧
A⊆P
(
A→ p0 =⇒ A⇒ p0
)
. (10)
Let us recall that a secret sharing scheme is said to be ideal if |S(p)| = |S(p0)| for all
p ∈ P .
The next theorem says that in ideal and perfect secret sharing schemes the partial
information about someone’s share never occurs.
Theorem 2 ([2], p.126, Theorem 3). Let M be an ideal and perfect secret sharing
scheme. Let A ⊆ P and p ∈ P o. If A→ p, then A⇒ p.
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Let P o be the set of participants of a secret sharing scheme M. A set A ⊆ P o is
said to be dependent if there is p ∈ A such that (A \ {p}) ⇒ p. Otherwise, A is called
independent. Let D(M) denote the family of all dependent sets of M. It is obvious
that if A ⊆ P is an authorized set, then A ∪ {p0} is dependent. It can be seen easily
that every minimal authorized set is independent.
3 Auxiliary results
In this section we shall prove some relations between the cardinalities of maximal
unauthorized sets and independent ones. Let us denote throughout this paper q = |S|.
Theorem 3. If M is an ideal and perfect secret sharing scheme, then the number
of rows in M is not greater than q|B|+1 for every maximal unauthorized set B ⊆ P .
Proof. Let M be an ideal and perfect secret sharing scheme and let B ⊆ P be
a maximal unauthorized set. Suppose, contrary to our claim, that M has more than
q|B|+1 rows. Then there exist two different rows r˜, rˆ in M such that
M(r˜, B ∪ {p0}) = M(rˆ, B ∪ {p0}). (11)
Denote v = M(r˜, B) = M(rˆ, B) ∈ S|B|. From the fact that no two rows of M are
identical we obtain
M(r˜, p) = M(rˆ, p) (12)
for a certain participant p ∈ P \ B. Obviously B ∪ {p} is an authorized set, as B is
a maximal unauthorized set. Thus for every vector (v, α) ∈ S(B ∪ {p}) the secret is
determined uniquely. Let us assume that the participants in B try to guess the secret
testing all α ∈ S(p). Since M is an ideal scheme and for two different shares M(r˜, p)
and M(rˆ, p) the participants in B get the same secret M(r˜, p0) = M(rˆ, p0), there is at
least one value of the secret which cannot be obtained in this way. This shows that B
has some information on the secret, which implies that B is an authorized set, as M
is a perfect scheme. This contradiction completes the proof. 
Let us recall the following lemma which can be used for lower bound of the number
of rows of a secret sharing matrix.
Lemma 1 ([2], p.129, Lemma 4). Let M be an ideal and perfect secret sharing
scheme. If A is a minimal authorized set of participants, then |S(A)| = q|A|.
The lemma combined with Theorem 3 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If M is an ideal and perfect secret sharing scheme, then for every
maximal unauthorized set B ⊆ P and for every minimal authorized set A ⊆ P we have
|A| ≤ |B|+ 1.
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Proof. Let M be an ideal and perfect secret sharing scheme and let A and B be
sets of participants described in the assumptions of the theorem. Since A is a minimal
authorized set, from Lemma 1 we deduce that M has at least q|A| rows. On the other
hand, according to Theorem 3 the number of rows in M does not exceed q|B|+1. Hence
q|A| ≤ q|B|+1 which implies the claim. 
Lemma 2. Let M be an ideal and perfect secret sharing scheme. If A ⊆ P o is an
independent set, then for every v ∈ S|A| there is a row r such that M(r, A) = v.
Proof. Let M be an ideal and perfect secret sharing scheme. We proceed by
induction on k = |A|. For k = 1 the statement is true as the scheme is perfect. Let
A = {p1, . . . , pk} be an independent set with k ≥ 2. Let us note that A¯ = A \ {pk}
is also independent. Consider (α1, . . . , αk−1, αk) ∈ S
k. By the induction hypothesis
there is a row r¯ such that M(r¯, A¯) = (α1, . . . , αk−1). Since A is independent, the
participants in A¯ have no information about the share given to pk, i.e., there is a row
r such that M(r, A¯) = M(r¯, A¯) and M(r, pk) = αk. This completes the proof. 
Let us recall that every minimal authorized set is independent, so the above lemma
is a generalization of Lemma 1. The next theorem is strengthening of Corollary 1.
Theorem 4. Let M be an ideal and perfect secret sharing scheme. If A ⊆ P is
an independent set, then |A| ≤ |B| + 1 for every maximal unauthorized set B ⊆ P .
Moreover, if A ⊆ P is unauthorized and independent, then |A| ≤ |B| for every maximal
unauthorized set B ⊆ P .
Proof. The proof of the first statement is similar to the proof of Corollary 1 -
instead of Lemma 1 we use Lemma 2.
To prove the second statement, we deduce from Lemma 2 that |S(A)| = q|A|. Since
A is unauthorized, for every v ∈ S(A) and for every α ∈ S(p0) there exists a row r
such that M(r, A) = v and M(r, p0) = α. Hence M has at least q
|A|+1 rows. We now
apply Theorem 3 to obtain q|A|+1 ≤ q|B|+1 which implies the claim. 
4 Secret sharing schemes and matroids
Before we present a connection between the secret sharing schemes and the matroids,
we should recall one of many equivalent ways of defining matroids (see [9]).
A matroid M is an ordered pair (E, I) consisting of a finite set E and I ⊆ 2E
satisfying the following conditions:
(1) ∅ ∈ I.
(2) If I1 ∈ I and I2 ⊆ I1, then I2 ∈ I.
(3) If I1, I2 ∈ I and |I1| < |I2|, then there exists an element e ∈ I2 \ I1 such that
I1 ∪ {e} ∈ I.
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The members of I are called the independent sets of M. A subset of E that is not
in I is called dependent. A maximal independent set in M is called a base. A minimal
dependent set in M is called a circuit.
Lemma 3 ([9], p.17, Lemma 1.2.2). If B1 and B2 are bases of a matroid M,
x ∈ B2 \ B1, then there exists y ∈ B1 \ B2, such that a set (B2 \ {x}) ∪ {y} is also a
base of M.
Lemma 4 ([9], p.16, Lemma 1.2.1). If B1 and B2 are bases of a matroid, then
|B1| = |B2|.
The number of elements of an arbitrary base of a matroid M is called the rank of M.
A relation between the secret sharing scheme and the matroids is described in the
following theorem.
Theorem 5 ([2], p.126, Theorem 1). If M is an ideal and perfect secret sharing
scheme, then D(M) is a family of all dependent sets of a connected matroid.
Let us recall that the connected matroid is a matroid (E, I) in which for any two
different elements x, y ∈ E there exists a circuit C such that x, y ∈ C. The matroid
determined by dependent sets of a secret sharing scheme M will be called the matroid
associated with the scheme M and denoted byM. Obviously, M is uniquely determined
by M.
5 Hierarchical Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes
For given positive integers k < n, a (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is a scheme
such that the set of participants P has n elements and the family Γ = {A ⊆ P :
|A| ≥ k} is its access structure. There are many constructions of threshold secret
sharing schemes. The most prominent one is the Shamir scheme [4] which is ideal and
perfect. A finite field Fq (q is a power of a prime) is both the set of secrets and the
sets of shares of the scheme.
The entries of the matrix M of a (k, n)-threshold Shamir scheme are elements of
a finite field Fq. The participants p0, p1, . . . , pn are identified by different elements
x0 = 0, x1, . . . , xn ∈ Fq. The rows of the matrix are labelled by polynomials over
Fq of degree less than k. For such a polynomial f the corresponding row of M equals
(f(0), f(x1), . . . , f(xn)). Obviously, f(0) is a secret. Every set of at least k participants
can pool their shares together and using the Lagrange interpolation finds a unique
polynomial of degree less than k which identifies a suitable row of the matrix and
consequently, they determine the secret.
Tassa [1] considers the problem of secret sharing among a group of participants with
the hierarchical structure. In such a setting P is composed of levels:
P = P1∪˙ · · · ∪˙Pl. (13)
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The access structure is constructed in such a way that if A is an authorized set, then
any participant in A ∩ Pi can be replaced by a participant from Pj with j ≤ i and
the resulting set remains authorized. For every level i ∈ {1, . . . , l} of the hierarchy
a threshold ki is defined. It is assumed that 0 < k1 < . . . < kl. A set A ⊆ P
is said to satisfy the threshold property of level i (which we abbreviate to TPi) if
|A ∩
⋃i
s=1 Ps| ≥ ki. The notation TPi(A) denotes that A satisfies TPi.
The access structures considered by Tassa are the following:
Γ∧ = {A ⊆ P : ∀i∈{1,2,...,l}TPi(A)}, (14)
Γ∨ = {A ⊆ P : ∃i∈{1,2,...,l}TPi(A)}. (15)
The main results described in [1] are the constructions of ideal and perfect secret
sharing schemes that realize Γ∧ and Γ∨. Moreover, Tassa notices that the above access
structures are two extreme members of a family {Γv : v = 1, . . . , l} of the hierarchical
threshold access structures:
Γv = {A ⊆ P : TPi(A) for at least v values of i ∈ {1, . . . , l}}. (16)
Indeed, Γ1 = Γ∨ and Γl = Γ∧. The open problem posed by Tassa is whether there
exists an ideal and perfect secret sharing scheme realizing Γv for v ∈ {2, . . . , l−1}. We
shall show in Theorem 6 that in general the answer is negative.
For simplicity of notation, we define σ(A) = (t1, t2, . . . , tl) with ti = |A ∩ Pi|.
Theorem 6. Let 0 = k0 < k1 < . . . < kl be a sequence of integers. Let P =
P1∪˙ . . . ∪˙Pl be a hierarchical structure in a set of participants with |Pi| ≥ ki− ki−1 for
every i = 1, . . . l. If v ∈ {2, . . . , l − 1}, |Pl−v+1| ≥ kl and |Pl−v+2| ≥ kl − k1 then the
access structure Γv is not realized by any ideal and perfect secret sharing scheme.
Proof. Let us fix v ∈ {2, . . . , l−1} and suppose that there exists ideal and perfect
secret sharing scheme M that realizes Γv.
We begin by proving that a rank of the associated matroid M is at most kl. Let us
consider a set of participants A ⊆ P such that σ(A) = (t1, t2, . . . , tl), where
ti =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
k1 for i = 1;
ki − ki−1 − 1 for i = v;
ki − ki−1 otherwise.
(17)
We will show that A is the maximal unauthorized set of participants. If 1 < j ≤ v − 1
then
|A ∩ (
j⋃
i=1
Pi)| =
j∑
i=1
ti = kj . (18)
If v ≤ j < l then
|A ∩ (
j⋃
i=1
Pi)| =
j∑
i=1
ti = kj − 1. (19)
This shows that A does not satisfy TPj for j ≥ v, so A is unauthorized. However,
adding an arbitrary participant p ∈ P \ A to A makes it authorized as A ∪ {p} fulfils
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TPj for all j ≤ v − 1 and j ≥ i if p ∈ Pi. From the fact that |A| = kl − 1 and Theory
4 we deduce that the rank of the associated matroid M is at most kl.
Our next goal is to show that a rank of the associated matroid M is equal exactly kl.
We achieve it by indicating a minimal authorized set of participants with kl elements.
Let us consider a set B1 ⊆ P such that
σ(B1) = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−v
, kl, 0, . . . , 0). (20)
It is easily seen that B1 fulfils TPi, for i = l − v + 1, l − v + 2, . . . , l. Moreover, any
proper subset of B1, does not fulfil TPl. This shows that B1 is a minimal authorized
set, so it is an independent set in the associated matroid M. Thus we get that the rank
of M is exactly kl and B1 is a base.
Next we consider a set B2 such that
σ(B2) = (k1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−v
, kl − k1, 0, . . . , 0) (21)
and show that B2 is also a base in the associated matroid M. It is easy to check that
it fulfils TPi for i = 1, l − v + 2, . . . , l, i.e., exactly for v values of i. Additionally, the
set B2 \ {p} does not fulfil TP1 or TPl accordingly to p ∈ P1 ∩B2 or p ∈ Pl−v+2 ∩B2.
Now we are in a position to apply Lemma 3. For p ∈ B2 ∩ P1 there exists p
′ ∈ B1
such that B3 = (B2 \ {p}) ∪ {p
′} is a base and consequently B3 is independent. It is
easy to see that
σ(B3) = (k1 − 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−v−1
, 1, kl − k1, 0, · · · , 0) (22)
as B1 ⊆ Pl−v+1. It is obvious that B3 fulfils TPi only for i = l − v + 2, . . . , l, which
shows that B3 is unauthorized. According to the second part of Theorem 4, we have
kl = |B3| ≤ |A| = kl − 1. This contradiction finishes the proof. 
6 Conclusions
In Theorem 6 we have proved that in general the problem of Tassa has negative
solution, but still in some cases not covered by Theorem 6, the problem whether Γv,
v ∈ {2, . . . , l − 1}, is realized as the access structure of an ideal and perfect secret
sharing scheme remains open.
The information rate of a secret sharing scheme is defined by
ρ := min
i∈{1,...,n}
log2 |S|
log2 |Ui|
, (23)
where Ui is a set of all possible shares of participant pi. If there does not exist an
associated matroid of a secret sharing scheme, then the information rate of such a
scheme is at most 2/3 (see [10]). The information rate of an access structure Γ is the
supremum of the information rates of all secret sharing schemes realizing the access
structure with a finite domain of shares. We do not know if Γv, 2 ≤ v ≤ l − 1,
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can be realized by a secret sharing scheme for which an associated matroid exists.
Summarising, the question is what is the actual information rate of Γv for 2 ≤ v ≤ l−1.
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